Professor Jackson's lecture for Module 7 was probably my favorite because the topic of Great Powers has more context than some of the more abstract previous module topics. As I was watching and listening, I began reflecting on how Professor Jackson purposively presents his lectures in a very broad and academic manner as the introductory course to this master's program. I could not help but also reflect on how after 30 years in special operations, I view the world a bit different than Jackson and most others. In this blog, I will attempt to contrast some of the concepts that Professor Jackson mentions with my own worldview/biases as a former operator and planner.
Jackson discusses in the lecture how prediction is difficult, and therefore he suggests that "forecasting" and "scenario planning" are more useful. I had been instructed that during operational level planning the staff must "anticipate and provide options for the commander."
Jackson discusses the concept of forecasting using the "most likely" and the "most desirable" outcomes. In the U.S. military, the commander's staff intelligence section typically prepares an enemy "most likely course of action" and "most dangerous course of action." The enemy "most likely course of action" is sometimes described as the enemy will most likely continue doing today what it did yesterday. The "most dangerous course of action" is the worst case scenario where the enemy either mobilizes its reserves, launches an all-out offensive operation, and/or decides to use the most potent weapons in its arsenal.
In reflecting on the difference in these two approaches, it seems to me that conceptualizing "most likely" and "most desirable" outcomes is more aligned with a constructivist theory of international relations based on ideas. The "most likely" and "most dangerous" analysis naturally lends itself to a more realist perspective of international relations where power, strategy, and worst case scenario contingency planning are the standard.
Military doctrine is a guide to action. It is authoritative, but requires judgment in application. U.S. Army doctrine has been undergoing a change as the U.S. military plans on redeploying and eventually withdrawing from Afghanistan. This coincides with the focus shifting from a force conducting stability/counterinsurgency operations to a force with a primary emphasis on combined arms maneuver against a near peer competitor such as Iran or China. Note that this shift is essentially transitioning from the "most likely" threat to the "most dangerous" threat in terms of potential enemies.
This was a relevant example to apply to the theories we discussed in class. Military operations provide an especially dynamic arena that warrants forecasting and scenario planning. A realist perspective seems almost necessary to consider a “worst possible scenario” within a given situation, since you would be analyzing the “other” as rational and self-serving. By framing this way of decision making in this context, you are able to better conceptualize what is, at times, a complex way of formulating a contingency plan for international relations.
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