More Thoughts on Private Security Firms

Having read this week's blogs by Caj and Dave A., I will provide my own thoughts on private security firms.

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/30/us/before-shooting-in-iraq-warning-on-blackwater.html?action=click&contentCollection=Opinion&module=MostEmailed&version=Full&region=Marginalia&src=me&pgtype=article&_r=0

I also read the recent New York Times article that portrays Blackwater as cowboys because of the 2007 Nisour Square incident in Iraq. The article mentions that four of the former Blackwater employees involved are being tried for a second time by the U.S. government after charges were dismissed in 2009 against five guards. The author, James Risen, has written extensively about the State Department over the years, and he tends to sharpshoot the actions taken by the U.S. military and other government agencies. I think the author presents a biased view against Blackwater.

My first point is that it is easy to second guess the guy or unit on the ground after an incident and find fault. I have a fair amount of experience working with State Department, Blackwater, private security firms, and other government agencies. Cooperation and professionalism between the diverse organizations deployed in support of the U.S. government varies based on the quality of the individuals and their leaders. Each organization has its own unique history and culture. The big buzzword is unity of purpose, but each element uses different metrics to quantify mission success.

Second, in the security realm an imminent threat is not always crystal clear. In a semi-permissive or non-permissive environment, both military and armed contractors have the right to defend themselves, their teammates, and their equipment from perceived threats. When in close proximity in urban areas or hostile environments, an operator sometimes has tenths of a second to react to a hostile threat.

I think that some people forget that the First Battle of Fallujah in 2004 was a result of Iraqi insurgents ambushing a convoy that included four Blackwater contractors. The four armed contracts were killed by machine-gun fire and a grenade thrown through the window of their SUVs. A mob then set their bodies ablaze, and their corpses were dragged through the streets before being hung over a brick crossing the Euphrates. Operation Vigilant Resolve was an operation designed to root out extremist elements of Fallujah and bring those responsible for the killing of the four Blackwater contractors. The key takeaway is that Blackwater employees in Iraq and Afghanistan were in harm's way as much and often more than U.S. servicemen who due to their duties rarely left the base.

Dave A. makes a strong argument that private security firms are not always as capable as the U.S. military. However, there are just not enough service personnel to provide security for all U.S. government entities in a combat zone. U.S. military units also are investigated and second guessed for overreacting to perceived enemy threats. A good example for Dave is the March 4, 2007, incident in which a group of U.S. Marine special operators were attacked by small arms fire in Nangahar Province, Afganistan. The Marines returned fire and 10 Afghan civilians were killed. During the investigation, some eyewitnesses interviewed claimed that the Marines responded with excessive force. The Marine company commander was relieved and the unit was expelled from Afghanistan.

I agree with Dave A. that the use of private contractors will continue due to necessity. I am currently a government contractor for Northrop Grumman working for the U.S. Army stateside as an analyst. I want to believe that my action guy days are over. However, as a former special operator I know that both service members and private security contractors are placed in dangerous situations and must react instinctually to hostile threats. While the actions of U.S. service members and private security contractors will continue to be scrutinized, I tend to give the benefit of the doubt to the operator(s) who I believe should err on the side of living.

The (future) Redistribution of Power

On June 16^th, Foreign Affairs published an article titled “The Age of Entropy” by Randall Schweller.  Schweller argues that we will likely move from our current age of predicable order led by a single or small group of superpowers, to an age of uncertainty characterized by a number of smaller powers that differ in nature and manner of leadership.  In a rather frank statement, Schweller says,   

“rather than asking themselves which country is most likely to replace the United States, they ought to be asking themselves whether the concept of global hegemony still applies in our era.”

Schweller mentions nations, corporations, ideological movements, crime and terrorist groups and human rights organizations as examples of new potential powers that will be able to lead and influence the global realm.   Schweller anticipates that our future will be characterized by frequent cold threats and increased problems between these smaller powers.  Further, cooperative resolutions will be harder to attain.  Through the redistribution of power, dominance will instead be asserted through cold threats and physical violence avoided. 

Wars of the past, in Schweller’s perspective, were “a good thing in some sense, because they replenished the international system with new energy in service of world order and lasting peace.”  From a purely objective perspective, this statement makes sense.  Fresh from the field of battle, state actors would want to do everything they could to avoid future loss.   Partnerships would be strengthened, resolutions passed, and disagreements settled amicably.  However, without the threat of a hot war, actors may not feel the urgency needed to promote lasting peace.  We may instead see a rise in the manipulation of economic assets, boycotts, and trade restrictions as these smaller powers wield their authority unchecked by a hegemonic power. 

While reading this article, I was reminded of Prof. Jackson’s lecture this week.  In his lecture, he says that states successfully hold a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force in a given territory.  If Schweller’s perspective is correct and power shifts to entities such as organizations, corporations, or terrorist groups, I would anticipate that this monopoly would end.  The legitimate use of force by states may likely pass along to privatized security forces supported by those in power, such as the PSCs seen in Nigeria and Saudi Arabia. 

Considered in its entirety, Schweller’s perspective is not a positive one, in fact stating that we are on the “cusp of an eternal purgatory.” Confusion and instability are not adjectives we necessarily want describing the global realm, despite the positive growth of global peace.  He seems to think this result is inevitable, but is it too late to change course?

Exploring Legitimate Violence Among States

Professor Jackson’s soliloquy this week talked a lot about the role of violence in the public and the legitimacy of that violence. He left use with a few questions to ponder, does legitimate violence exist? Is any violence legitimate? A state protects its sovereignty and territoriality with violence, violence plays an important role in maintaining that state, so whether the violence is legitimate or not is important.

For the sake of this post, I am operating under the assumption that violence can be considered legitimate. Is violence only legitimate when a state uses it to protect its sovereignty, or territory? Who determines whether that violence is legitimate or not in particular situations? What if the state is no longer acting in the interest of protecting is sovereignty, are the people of the state then able to use legitimate violence to force a change?

Another way to look at these questions is to look at a current example in world politics. If you have been following the news at all, you are aware that ISIS militants have been fighting in Iraq and taking over cities and fighting over key oil rigs. ISIS has been using violence to take over cities and people. Is this use of violence legitimate if they see that there is a fundamental error with their current government? Is it considered legitimate violence if the state of Iraq fights back? What about other states reacting and using violence to combat ISIS; is that considered legitimate violence? If the state asks another state to engage in violence, such as the use of drones, is that legitimate? Why or why not?

I believe that, with the assumption that there can be legitimate violence, the use of force is acceptable if the state is using it to protect its territory. If the state is asking for help in protecting itself by inviting another state to use force, which can also be seen as legitimate because it is affecting the state’s self-interest. The fighters, like ISIS, are not using force legitimately because there could be alternatives before engaging in this kind of violence.

That is just one way to look at this example. What do you think? 

Authority, Violence, and Clausewitz

Dr. Jackson's soliloquy on Public Authority and the Control of Violence was good, but it also was typical of his others in being a bit abstract. He describes violence in a very academic manner. Due to my military background and having spent the last five years in the school house environment at Fort Leavenworth, any discussion of the use of violence by the state leads to the Prussian military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz. Although Clausewitz's On War was written in the early 19th century based on his experiences derived from the Napoleonic wars, it still provides the best general theory on war. 

Clausewitz's work is dense and was not fully completed when he died, but it displays brilliance. 

For example, in Book 8 Clausewitz states: "war is simply the continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means." Thus, "war is an instrument of policy."

Clausewitz uses the paradoxical trinity to describe how violence, chance, and reason are war's dominant tendencies. He represents violence with the people; chance with the commander and his army; and reason with the government. In essence, he implies that the three must be in balance for the successful conduct of war.

Clausewitz uses the term "friction" to describe what separates war from every other human phenomenon due to its violent nature. Clausewitz writes: "Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war."  This quote is very apropos when one considers the United States' recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

 

Middle East Today Compared to 17th Century Europe

Richard Haass is the President of the Council on Foreign Relations and a former Director of Policy Planning for the United States Department of State and close advisor to Secretary of State Colin Powell. This morning he was a guest on Fareed Zakaria GPS to discuss the situation in Iraq where the radical Islamic group ISIS has recently seized Mosul and Tikrit and currently threatens Baghdad. I found the following comments by Haass fascinating and relevant to our course:

"The Middle East we know was essentially drawn up or designed 100 years ago by the British and French foreign minister. And that Middle East is unraveling. If there's a historical analog here and it's not going to make you or anyone watching this program feel very happy, it's Europe in the early part of the 17th century, where you had, you know, political religious wars within and across boundaries that lasted for 30 years. 

And I think we're into that sort of a situation in the Middle East. There's no boundary anymore between, say, Syria and Iraq. It may exist on a map on paper but not in reality. So we have identities now that don't in any way line up with where the formal borders are. So what we have to do is preserve those areas, as you say, where we have friends, where we have real interest, where we see some reason to believe that American involvement would pay off. "

Haass compared the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) which ended with Peace of Westphalia to the current fighting in the Middle East. The Thirty Years War significantly impacted Thomas Hobbes and Leviathan was his vision of the way forward for England and Europe. 

The link to this course are the issues at hand in the Middle East such as sovereignty, ideas, interests, and borders. First, the Middle East has deep-rooted religious differences between Jews, Christians, Sunnis, and Shiites. Religion is even more important because it plays a critical role in the identity for each of these nations. Israel's identity is associated with being the  Jewish homeland.  Iraq had a Sunni government under Saddam Hussein ruling while the majority of the people are Shia. Assad's Allawite regime is a minority ruling a country where Sunnis are the predominate religious group. Iran is basically a Persian Shia Islamic state where the Supreme Leader is the head of state and highest ranking religious authority.

The Middle East has borders created by Britain and France after World War I that create serious tensions in these countries. Haass is essentially saying that it will not be possible for Iraq to maintain itself as one sovereign state with Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds peacefully co-existing. ISIS also presents a challenge to the existing border of Iraq and Syria. 

Only time will tell if Haass is correct with his point of view. I do agree that the Middle East has some serious issues to resolve, and the future does not look peaceful. It will be interesting to see how the current Middle Eastern internal power struggles in Iraq, Syria, and Egypt affect the overall global world order.

Week Six - Perspective and progress

Like many of my fellow classmates, my view concerning our debate was divided.  I am an optimist at heart (nod to DjsB’s blog post), and would like to believe that the international environment can fundamentally change.  The incremental strides that the international community has made toward peace reflect an improvement, and it is evident that our international institutions are attempting to nurture a sense of global cooperation in pursuit of fundamental change. 

But to say that the change we’ve witnessed reflects an enduring trend is to neglect the evolving relationships of international actors and institutions.  As Taylor pointed out in her blog post this week, we must first answer the question “what does the international environment currently look like” before we can address whether or not it can be remade.  Perspective in this case is key.  The international environment may look different to different actors at different times, and their opinion of “improvement” depends on their perspective.  The relationships that comprise cooperative action within the international environment are ephemeral.  Relationships are based on perceived interests, but these interests change and perceptions change.  History, rumors, studies of varying reliability and opinions often take precedence over fact and can greatly impact cooperative efforts, often to their detriment. 

Ultimately, I believe that in order for fundamental change to occur, an idea of what’s best for the global community must come before individual worldviews and parochial interests.  Differences in worldviews impact ideas of what needs to be changed in the international environment, decisions on how to change it, and ultimately, what is considered change.  These are the most rigid obstacles to overcome in order to achieve a mutual understanding of how best to achieve fundamental change.

These differences in our experience of the world and how we may perceive the same event has turned me into a critic regarding the possibility of fundamental international change, although an optimistic one.  In order for change to be experienced and recognized internationally, there will have to be an incredible amount of change for a very long time.  Small changes, and lots of them, will have to occur before fundamental change is recognized. 

There is no simple answer to the question we debated.  Change, in my opinion, is possible, and as we progress along the path toward fundamental international change there will likely be a number of hiccups along the way in the form of clashing ideas.

Debate Reflections

After the debate this past week, I still find myself skeptical that we will see the international environment fundamentally change, though I do not think it is impossible. Both sides brought up a lot of great points and each side focused on different aspects, which brought about an interesting discussion. As we talked about in this week’s live session, I think we focused a lot of the structure of the sovereign and the role of international organizations played in the international environment. I believe both groups operated under the assumption that a fundamental change in the international environment would look like a change in sovereign territory. This idea was brought about both in Professor Jackson’s lecture and other people have noted this is their blog posts. I think it is important to address the underlying assumptions of each group’s arguments before discussing other points that were relevant to the discussion.

I would like to focus on some topics that I do not think were talked about in as much detail in the debate as they could have been – obviously neither side had enough time to fully talk about every important aspect involved in this debate. Specifically, how gender and technology play a role in a changing environment. These two variables were discussed in Jackson’s lecture about contributing to change but I do not think either group put too much weight in them. The pro group did bring up the example of the baboons and how a change in their environment was reflected with the role of female and male baboons, but I do not think this example was meant to discuss how gender roles can affect change. They also discussed human rights, which gender roles do fall under that category, however, I think that was a topic that could have been expanded upon. The human rights example used in the debate focused on marriage equality in particular.

It would have been interesting to bring up how gender roles have changed throughout the world, but also how they have stagnated. This could both be an example of how the sociality of the international environment changes as well as given examples to what has stayed the same. Things such as the rate of females in leadership roles of government across nations as well as governments that still openly discriminate against a person’s gender would point the change and things that haven’t changed in the environment. These subtler aspects sound to me like an Onuf constructivist argument that rules change (gender rules and norms that evolve and ones that don’t) and how those changes affect the sovereign states. Would those changes demonstrate that there can be a fundamental change in the international environment?

Along those same lines, how does technology facilitate change in sovereign states that are autonomous vs. not? What about hard v. soft boundaries? Are these even necessary to discuss based on everything else we have talked about? 

Reflecting on these points may bring about other interesting discussion points from this debate. Again, I still find myself somewhere in the middle, but thinking through other aspects may help me find a firmer stance on this debate.

Week 6 - President Obama at Omaha Beach

In anticipation of President Obama’s June 6 speech at Omaha Beach, New York Times columnist, Roger Cohen, wrote an interesting Op-Ed on June 5, 2014, evaluating the president on his foreign policy. Cohen then takes it a step further and ponders how Obama would have handled the presidency during the Normandy invasion.

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/06/opinion/cohen-obama-at-omaha.html?hp&rref=opinion&_r=0

Cohen first describes what he expects from a US president: “Any American leader must embody the nation’s commitment to the spread of liberty, the defense of allies and the sanctity of the American ‘red lines’ that are the guarantors of global security.” Then Cohen assesses President Obama based on that standard. Cohen outlines why he believes that the president falls short with regard to Syria, Egypt, Crimea, and Eastern Ukraine.

Cohen then makes the great leap of surmising how Obama would have done as president with regard to being Commander in Chief during the time of the Omaha Beach amphibious assault. Cohen concludes his Op-Ed: “Obama would argue he is a realist adapting to a changed world in the wake of two taxing wars. He has a point. But realism did not win the day at Omaha. No realist would have attempted such impossible landings. If he takes one lesson away from the beaches for the remainder of his presidency, it should be that.”

Here is my critique of Cohen’s piece:

 First, while Cohen uses the terms realist” and “realism,” he is not using it in the sense that international relations professionals would use those words. He is using it more in a political commentary sense.

Second, it is almost impossible to compare World War II where Japan attacked Pearl Harbor and Hitler declared war on the United States to decisions to intervene in Syria and Crimea. It is apples and oranges. World War II was the ultimate good war. Germany and Japan were clearly the aggressors, and both of those countries displayed barbaric and inhumane behavior. The liberation of Europe was vital to the United States and its allies. The internal strife in Syria and Egypt is tragic, but clearly not vital to US national security interests.

Agency, pacifism, and the anniversary of the Tiananmen Protests

Tomorrow, June 4^th, marks the anniversary of the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989.  Many of you may recognize the photo below, often dubbed “Tank Man,” which serves as a reminder of the protests’ peaceful beginnings and violent end. 

The protest began as a peaceful, student-led demonstration.  The students gathered in Tiananmen Square to express their dissatisfaction with the current regime, and called for government accountability and freedom of speech.  The peaceful protest and hunger strike attracted international attention, and within weeks hundreds of similar protests had spread across China.  The protests divided the Chinese government, which had decided to use force to dissuade protestors.  On June 4^th, Chinese police violently broke up the demonstrators with live ammunition, killing anywhere from a hundred to over a thousand people.  Official numbers vary, since the dead were cremated quickly in order to skew the official body count and limit public outcry.

Agency, as Professor Jackson defines it, is an actor’s capacity to have acted otherwise.  The Tiananmen Square protestors had agency.  Instead of choosing violence, or simply inaction, they chose to stage a nonviolent peaceful sit-in and hunger strike.  Their action can be considered a collaborative effort that, as Prof. Jackson mentioned, is often seen in social movements.  Demonstrating their dissatisfaction through nonviolence inspired Chinese citizens and brought about support for their cause.  Peace activist and scholar David Cortright argues, “nonviolent resistance has indeed become a force more powerful, because it offers a third way, distinct from war and inaction, for addressing the challenge of injustice” (Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas, pg. 213).  The demonstrators suffered through their hunger strike in order to make their concerns known, and were able to attract international attention and sympathy through their pacifism.  The nature of nonviolent agency promoted the integrity of the demonstrators, garnered the support of Chinese citizens, and turned them against the government. 

The structure of China’s government resisted the fundamental change asked for by the protestors.  Their decision to react with violence suggests that they were threatened by the uprisings and what it could mean for China’s future.  Many liberal Chinese government officials who sympathized with the protestors were purged, and the Chinese government tried to expunge the June 4^th events from its history through immediate propaganda supporting police action and vilifying demonstrators.   Their structure at the time was strong enough to reign in the protestors without threat of retaliation or loss of power, exemplifying the impractical possibility of fundamental change as well as the continuity of the Chinese Communist Party.

The Tiananmen Square protest was a defining moment for the Chinese government, and resulted in increased conservatism of leaders and a push to maintain public confidence in the Chinese Communist Party through economic reforms.   The protests of 1989 are not taught in school, and to speak of it, even 25 years after the event itself, is considered taboo and worthy of punishment, serving as a reminder to the strength of the Chinese government.  

Rational Design of International Institutions

The main argument that Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal make in their article The Rational Design of International Institutions “is that states use international institutions to further their own goals and design institutions accordingly” (762). This is their explanation for why we can observe differences in international institutions.

 I found this to be a really interesting article that they laid out and something that we could have used when we had our projects about international institutions and the ideas of coercion or reason. They referred to the EU for a lot of examples, so I would like to try address the key ways that institutions vary with another international institution that one of our groups talked about, NATO. 

Membership for NATO comes from North America and Europe. NATO focuses on the ideas and interests of its member countries with diplomatic and military capabilities. NATO’s power is centralized in its member countries, with a council that has permanent and rotating members. NATO has control over protecting the security of its member states; the control is enforced by the agreement to participate and negotiate by its member states. NATO has the ability to be flexible when new outcomes and problems arise, but it is not always flexible in new situations NATO was an international organization created to protect the interests of its members through political and military means. 

The reason for this organization’s existence, is why it is different than say, the EU or the UN; it has a different focus, though they may be similar in some regards. Do you believe the design of the institution is created to further the state’s own goals? How does agency relate to and affect these differences?

·         Information on NATO: http://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html#basic

Week 4 -Pre-Class: The Obama Commencement Address at West Point

President Obama's commencement address at West Point certainly was a popular topic in the media last week. I will look at the speech from a few different perspectives attempting to tie in concepts we have discussed in this course so far.

David Brooks wrote a New York Times Op-Ed on May 29 that mentioned the West Point commencement address ( http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/30/opinion/brooks-the-autocracy-challenge.html?ref=opinion&_r=00 ). This particular quote jumped out at me:

"For most of the past 70 years, the U.S. had a two-level foreign policy. On top, American diplomats built multilateral coalitions to extend democracy. But at the bottom level, American presidents understood their responsibility as the world’s enforcer, occasionally operating according to the logic of menace and force."

I think the quote highlights the topic of ideas versus interests. I think that the use of "multilateral coalitions to extend democracy" is based on an idea that cooperation with other states is the right thing to do. However, an American president acting according to the "logic of menace and force" is more aligned the with the classic realist perspective of interest first and foremost. 

A second more critical article was written by former Marine, former assistant secretary of defense, and author, Bing West, in National Review ( http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/378980/sad-half-hearted-address-wrong-audience-bing-west ). Bing West has been an outspoken critic of US policy and strategy in Afghanistan. West reviewed the president's four main paints from the foreign policy outlined in the speech. The first point again is pure realism: "If our core interests demand it, we will use force." However, after summarizing the next three points, West delivers a scathing conclusion. I will avoid weighing in on the critique of the foreign policy articulated, but I wholeheartedly agree with West on his final comment. A long foreign policy speech at a West Point commencement ceremony was not very inspiring to these newly commissioned Army officers and latest graduates of the long, grey line.